[i]LEGAL STATUS OF ISLANDS

– WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 121(3)

OF THE

UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

 

Jon M. Van Dyke

William S. Richardson School of Law

University of Hawai`i at Manoa

Honolulu, Hawai`i USA

 

Seoul, Korea

December 9, 1999

 

            Islands present three distinct legal issues – (A) how can sovereignty be obtained over them, (B) should they be entitled to generate extended maritime zones (continental shelves and exclusive economic zones), and (C) should they affect maritime boundary delimitations.

 

THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES

            Several decisions provide guidance regarding the rules that govern the ability of a nation to claim ownership of isolated uninhabited island features--the Clipperton^[ii] and Isle of Palmas^[iii] arbitrations and the decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Minquiers and Ecrehos^[iv] and Gulf of Fonseca^[v] cases.

            Clipperton is a remote and barren atoll 600 miles south of Mexico in the Pacific Ocean which was claimed by France for its guano in 1858, but then ignored for decades because the guano was not commercially exploitable.  After Mexico asserted jurisdiction over the atoll in the 1890s (claiming historic links traced back to earlier Spanish explorers), France and Mexico agreed to submit the ownership dispute to arbitration, selecting as arbitrator Victor Emmanuel, the Italian Emperor.  When the decision was finally announced many decades later, in 1931, the award went to France, based primarily on its initial formal "discovery" of the atoll.  The Emperor's opinion states that something more than mere discovery is normally needed to establish ownership--"effective occupation" is also required.  And "effective occupation" usually requires a presence in the territory and some governmental structure capable of enforcing laws.  But for uninhabited islets, these requirements are apparently reduced.  All that is necessary is that "from the first moment when the occupying State makes its appearance there," the territory is "at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state."^[vi]  As applied to the facts of Clipperton's history, France's claim would appear to have been flimsy even under these weak criteria, because U.S. citizens had explored Clipperton and Mexico had established a garrison there.^[vii]  Nonetheless, the Emperor felt the French claim had not been discredited by these events, and France was awarded title to the atoll.

            The Palmas Island case concerned an inhabited island, but the analysis given by Max Huber, the arbitrator to this dispute between the United States and the Netherlands, reinforces the principle that less is required to acquire ownership of uninhabited places.  The United States based its claim on Spain's earlier "discovery" and the island's "contiguity" or proximity to the main Philippine islands (which were then a colony of the United States).  The Netherlands (which then controlled Indonesia) invoked its contact with the region and its agreements with native princes.  The arbitrator favored the Dutch, based on their peaceful and continuous display of authority over Palmas.  Spain's "discovery" did not confer title because it was not accompanied by any subsequent occupation or attempts to exercise sovereignty.^[viii]  In that sense, the Palmas decision is inconsistent with Clipperton.  Arbitrator Huber also rejected the U.S. claim based on "contiguity," concluding that international law does not support such a principle.^[ix]

            The International Court of Justice addressed these issues in 1953 in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case.^[x]  Both France and the United Kingdom claimed title to a groups of islets and rocks between the British island of Jersey and the coast of France.^[xi]  Each party produced ancient historical titles from the Middle Ages, but the Court found these materials to be inconclusive^[xii] and instead focused on actual displays of authority during the 19th and 20th centuries.^[xiii]  Based on this evidence, the Court determined that the United Kingdom had exercised state functions over the features,^[xiv] and that France had not established any similar assertions of authority during this period.  The Court thus awarded title over all of them to the United Kingdom.^[xv]  The Court also relied for its decision on the view that the Minquiers group were a "dependency" of the Channel islands (Jersey and Guernsey) and thus should be subject to the same sovereign authority.^[xvi]

            A more recent case involving a dispute that bears some resemblance to the Spratlys is the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening),^[xvii] decided by a chamber of the International Court of Justice in 1992.  This case involved a dispute over sovereign ownership of several small islands in the Gulf of Fonseca, which is located where the boundaries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua meet.  This area had been governed by a colonial power--Spain--until 1821 when the region became independent and established the Federal Republic of Central America.^[xviii]  This entity lasted until it disintegrated in 1839, when the presently existing states of Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala were established.^[xix]  The Chamber ruled that the Fonseca islands were not terra nullius at that time, but instead were inherited by the new entities from Spain.  It then focused on which of the new countries occupied the islands, what actions indicated the exercise of authority over them, and to what extent the other states acquiesced in the exercise of authority.^[xx]            Id. at 565, para. 345.  The Chamber emphasized that it was not deciding whether occupation by one state over time could establish ownership in a case where a pre-existing title was held by another state.  Instead, the Chamber made clear that it was relying upon occupation and acquiescence as evidence of the recognition by the states of the region regarding which country had proper title over each of the disputed islands when the evidence regarding a pre-existing title was ambiguous.^[xxi]

            Based on these principles, the Chamber awarded the island of El Tigre to Honduras because of its occupation of this island for more than 100 years, accompanied by some evidence of recognition by El Salvador that Honduras was authorized to exercise authority over the island.^[xxii]  The Chamber then turned to Meanguera Island (1586 hectares and long-inhabited) and Meanguerita Island (26 hectares and uninhabited, lacking fresh water).^[xxiii]  The Chamber found evidence of occupation ("effective possession and control") of these islands by El Salvador since 1854, and found no effective protests by Honduras.^[xxiv]  The Chamber's conclusion was thus that "Honduras was treated as having succeeded to Spanish sovereignty over El Tigre, and El Salvador to Spanish sovereignty over Meanguera and Meanguerita," with Meanguerita being viewed as an "appendage" to or "dependency" of Meanguera.^[xxv]

            How do these somewhat conflicting precedents apply to the current disputes over ownership of islets?  Discovery alone does not give sufficient title, and some degree of "effective occupation" is needed.  Although the requirements for "discovery" of remote uninhabited islands (in a terra nullius status) may be less strict than for populated territories,^[xxvi] in cases of ambiguity and dispute a tribunal will look closely at evidence of occupation, exercise of authority, and acquiescence by other nations.  Recognition by other countries is certainly relevant.  Although abandonment cannot always be presumed by nonuse, especially if it is not voluntary,^[xxvii] tribunals will require effective exercise of authority in cases where evidence of discovery is disputed or ambiguous. 

            The Clipperton, Palmas, Minquiers and Ecrehos, and Gulf of Fonseca precedents  focus on "discovery" and--in particular--on "occupation" of small islets.  Although they do not require too much activity when the islet is uninhabitable, they do indicate a need for some formal acts and a sufficient presence to let others know of the claim. The Minquiers and the Gulf of Fonseca cases both stress recent occupation and control, and tend to ignore activities more than 100 years ago. In the Spratly dispute in the South China Sea, China has argued on occasion that Western requirements of formal declarations of sovereignty should not apply in Asia.  But their suggested substitute--long contact with a region–may not always be sufficient, because it does not put others on notice that a claim of exclusion has been made.

            Is "contiguity" or geographical proximity relevant to claims of sovereignty?  In the South China Sea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and even Vietnam have argued that they are entitled to some or all of the Spratlys because these islands are near their main territories.  Contiguity was rejected in both the Clipperton and Palmas decisions (it was not a factor in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case), but the argument continues to have a persistent practical appeal.  China, of course, thoroughly rejects it.^[xxviii]

 

WHEN CAN ISLETS GENERATE EXTENDED MARITIME ZONES?

            As explained above, the issues regarding sovereignty over small islet features are complicated, but once they are resolved another set of equally complicated issues present themselves regarding boundary delimitation.  These issues concern, first, whether the islet can generate extended maritime zones, and, second, whether the islets should have an effect on the delimitation of boundaries between adjacent and opposite states.

            Features That Are Submerged at High Tide Cannot Generate Maritime Zones

            This traditional principle of customary international law is confirmed in Article 121 of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention.  Claims to maritime zones based on reefs that are submerged at high tide, even if artificial structures have been built on them, are not valid.^[xxix]

 

What Island Features Have the Capacity under Article 121 to Generate EEZs or Continental Shelves?

 

            Features that are above water at high tide qualify as "islands" under Article 121 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and are generally entitled to territorial seas.  Article 121(3) says, however, that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own" do not generate exclusive economic zones or continental shelves.

            The word "rock" is not defined in the Convention, and has been subject to several interpretations.  One recent paper prepared by a U.S. law firm employed by Vietnam asserted that a consensus exists, and that "the overwhelming majority of commentators have argued that the term should be interpreted as including any small island."^[xxx]  This paper also asserted that the consensus agreed that the "human habitation" formula requires at least the possibility of a permanent civilian population--soldiers and light-house keepers are not sufficient.^[xxxi]  The language in Article 121(3) appears to require that the relevant "economic life" of features must be "of their own."  An artificial economic life supported by a distant population in order to gain control over an extended maritime zone is not sufficient.

            In earlier writings, I suggested that only islands that have shown the ability to sustain stable human populations of at least 50 persons should be allowed to generate maritime zones, and that the Spratlys do not meet this requirement.^[xxxii]  Other authors have reached similar conclusions regarding the inability of these islets to sustain human habitation and thus to generate exclusive economic zones or continental shelves.  Vietnamese officials now appear to have adopted the view that the Spratly islets cannot generate exclusive economic zones or continental shelves.[xxxiii]            In its May 12, 1977 Statement Declaring a Territorial Sea, a Contiguous Zone, a Continental Shelf and an Exclusive Economic Zone, para. 5, Vietnam made a broad claim for all such zones which one commentator has interpreted to include the Spratlies and Paracels as well as its mainland coasts.  See Valero, id. at 317 n.12.   Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia--who is now President of the Assembly of the International Sea-Bed Authority and the coordinator of the Indonesian-sponsored workshops on the South China Sea conflicts--has also expressed that view.^[xxxiv]  Although the arguments against allowing any of the Spratlys to generate extended zones seem strong, occasional authors continue to suggest that at least some of the islands can generate zones.^[xxxv]  And China frequently acts as if it assumes the islets can generate extended zones.

            How should this issue ultimately be resolved?  The best approach, in terms of international law, logic, and practicality would be to deny extended maritime zones to any islet that has not historically maintained a permanent population of at least 50 or so.  The concept of extended maritime zones was accepted in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention because it seemed appropriate to allow coastal populations to have primary responsibility to manage and exploit adjacent resources.  Where there is no indigenous population, however, this logic does not apply, and the extended zone should not be permitted.  Article 121(3) is based on this perception and should be interpreted in this light.

           

Should Tiny Islets that Are Artificially Expanded Be Characterized as "Artificial Islands," and, If So, What Would Their Legal Status Be?

 

            Article 60(8) of the Law of the Sea Convention states clearly that artificial islands do not have the capacity to generate exclusive economic zones or continental shelves.  It appears to be necessary to characterize some of the current structures in the South China Sea as "artificial islands."  The Chinese occupations of Subi Reef and Johnson South Reef seem like obvious candidates for this characterization, as does the Malaysian occupation of Dallas Reef, and the Vietnamese occupations of Vanguard and Prince of Wales Banks.  Another example is the Japanese islet of Okinotorishima.

            Article 60(8) was designed to discourage nations from building up submerged reefs and low-tide elevations in order to generate extended maritime zones where none had existed previously.  If it is not interpreted according to its clear language, then we would foresee continued efforts to reclaim submerged features in order to lay claim to open ocean areas.

 

Are All Islets That Are Above Water at High Tide Entitled to Generate 12-Nautical-Mile Territorial Seas?

 

            Article 3 of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention allows "Every State" to establish territorial seas around its land areas "to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles," and Article 121 allows every feature that is above water at high tide to generate such a zone.  Vietnam declared a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around the Spratlys in a 1977 statement^[xxxvi] and China did so in its 1992 Territorial Sea Law.^[xxxvii]  One commentator reports that Malaysia has claimed a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay but not its other claimed features.^[xxxviii]

            Even though the Law of the Sea Convention allows countries to declare 12-nautical-mile territorial seas around coasts and islands, it does not necessarily follow that a territorial sea of this size is legitimate in all locations and for all purposes.  Article 300, entitled "Good faith and abuse of rights," reminds countries that they must not invoke rights under the Convention in a manner that imposes an unacceptable burden on other nations.  Examples can be found where states have agreed to establish territorial seas of less than 12 nautical miles around islands that are on the "wrong" side of a median boundary line.  Hiran W. Jayewardene, in his 1990 book,^[xxxix] cites the cases of the Venezuelan island of Isla Patos, between Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago,^[xl] the Abu Dhabi island of Dayyinah, between Abu Dhabi and Qatar,^[xli] and the Australian islands in the Torres Strait, between Australia and Papua New Guinea,^[xlii] all of which have territorial seas of only three nautical miles.  The islands in the crowded Aegean Sea generate only six-nautical-mile territorial seas.^[xliii]  Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia observed in July 1995 that he did not feel the Spratly islets were entitled to any territorial seas at all, and instead should be simply protected by a small "safety zone."^[xliv]

 

WHAT PRINCIPLES GOVERN THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES?

 

            Once the difficult and complex issues identified above are addressed and resolved, it then becomes appropriate to determine how the maritime boundaries in a region should be drawn.  The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf^[xlv] and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone^[xlvi] adopted the "equidistance principle" as the method for resolving competing claims to surrounding waters.  Under this principle, a disputed area is divided along a line equidistant between the countries involved.  But the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention carefully avoids referring to "equidistance" as the proper approach, and instead provides in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) a carefully crafted formula that gives only subtle hints regarding how disputes should be resolved:

                                    The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [and continental shelf] between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.

 

The goal is thus to achieve an "equitable" resolution to boundary disputes, and a variety of principles have been developed to achieve this goal.

            One central "equitable principle" is that islands do not have an equal capacity with land masses to generate maritime zones.  Even if an islet is deemed to be capable of generating extended maritime zones, it would not command equal strength with an opposing continental area or larger island.  To put the process of the boundary delimitation in perspective, it is useful to survey the methods that have been used in recent years by the International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals.  Even though many of these principles do not directly concern islands, a listing of them is useful to aid in understanding the role islands play in these delimitations.

            The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral tribunals adjudicating maritime boundary disputes now follow a standard sequence in approaching a controversy.  Professor Jonathan Charney has recently described this common approach as follows:

                                    First, they define the relevant geographical area and the area in dispute.  Second, they identify the relevant areas and coastlines.  Third, they spell out all the relevant considerations.  Fourth, they develop a provisional line based upon an analysis of the relevant considerations.  Fifth, they check that line against some of the considerations to determine whether the line is "radically inequitable" and if so, they adjust it accordingly.^[xlvii]

The "equitable principles" that have been used in recent years to resolve boundary disputes include the following.

            ** The delimitations of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelves do not have to be the same, but all recent disputes have been resolved with a single maritime line.^[xlviii]  In the Jan Mayen dispute, the parties did not request a single zone, and the Court addressed the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone boundaries separately, but found the analysis to be identical and came up with a single line for both boundaries.^[xlix]

            ** The equidistance approach can be used as an aid to analysis, but it is not to be used as a binding or mandatory principle.  In the 1985 Libya/Malta case, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, and most recently the 1993 Jan Mayen case, the ICJ examined the equidistance line as an aid to its preliminary analysis, but then adjusted the line in light of the differences in the length of the coastlines of the contending parties.^[l]  This preliminary equidistance line is drawn from the coastlines themselves, not from any straight baselines.^[li]  The Court has made it clear in all these cases that the equidistance line is not mandatory or binding.

            ** The proportionality of coasts must be examined to determine if a maritime boundary delimitation is "equitable."  It has now become well established that an essential element of a boundary delimitation is the calculation of the relative lengths of the relevant coastlines.  If this ratio is not roughly comparable to the ratio of the provisionally delimited relevant water areas, then the tribunal will generally make an adjustment to bring the ratios into line with each other.^[lii]  In the recent Jan Mayen case, the ICJ determined that the ratio of the relevant coasts of Jan Mayen (Norway) to Greenland (Denmark) was 1:9, and ruled that this dramatic difference required a departure from reliance on the equidistance line.  The final result was perhaps a compromise between an equidistance approach and a proportionality-of-the-coasts approach, with Denmark (Greenland) receiving three times as much maritime space as Norway (Jan Mayen).

            Similarly, in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, the ICJ started with the median lines between the countries, but then adjusted the line northward through 18' of latitude to take account of the "very marked difference in coastal lengths"^[liii] between the two countries.  The court then confirmed the appropriateness of this solution by examining the "proportionality" of the length of the coastlines of the two countries^[liv] and the "equitableness of the result."^[lv]

            The proportionality-of-the-coastlines is thus not a mathematically mandatory requirement, but rather provides a rough sense of justice which the tribunal uses, along with other factors, to achieve a result that it deems to be "equitable."^[lvi]

            ** Geographic considerations will govern maritime boundary delimitations and nongeographic considerations will only rarely have any relevance.^[lvii]  The Gulf of Maine case was perhaps the most dramatic example of the Court rejecting submissions made by the parties regarding nongeographic considerations, such as the economic dependence of coastal communities on a fishery, fisheries management issues, and ecological data.

            The concept of the continental shelf as a "natural prolongation" of the adjacent continent is a geographical notion, but it has not received prominence in recent decisions.^[lviii]  Nevertheless, this term does appear in Article 76 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and thus may continue to be of some relevance.  To some extent, the principle of nonencroachment has taken the place of the natural-prolongation idea.

            ** The principle of nonencroachment.  This principle is explicitly articulated in Article 7(6) of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, which says that no state can use a system of straight baselines "in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."  It has recently been relied upon more expansively in the Jan Mayen case, where the Court emphasized the importance of avoiding cutting-off the extension of a coastal state's entry into the sea.  Even though Norway's Jan Mayen Island is minuscule in comparison with Denmark's Greenland, Norway was allocated a maritime zone sufficient to give it equitable access to the important capelin fishery that lies between the two land features.^[lix]  The unusual 16-nautical-mile wide and 200-nautical-mile long corridor drawn in Canada and France's St. Pierre and Miquelon case also appears to have been based on a desire both to avoid cutting off these islands' coastal fronts from the sea but at the same time to avoid blocking access to the open ocean for Canada's Newfoundland coast.

            ** The principle of maximum reach.  This principle first emerged in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,^[lx] where Germany received a pie-shaped wedge to the equidistant point even though this allocation cut into the claimed zones of Denmark and the Netherlands.  Professor Charney reports that this approach has been followed in all later cases:  "No subsequent award or judgment has had the effect of fully cutting off a disputant's access to the seaward limit of any zone."^[lxi]  In the Gulf of Fonseca case, the Court recognized the existence of an undivided condominium regime in order to give all parties access to the maritime zone and its resources,^[lxii] and in the St. Pierre and Miquelon case France was given a narrow corridor connecting its territorial sea with the outlying high seas.^[lxiii]  The geographical configuration in the Jan Mayen case presented different issues.  But even in this situation the Court gave Norway more than it "deserved" considering the small coastline and geographical size of Jan Mayen island.  The motive apparently was to enable Norway to have at least "limited geographical access to the middle of the disputed area,"^[lxiv] which contained a valuable fishery.

            Professor Charney identifies several interests that are served by the maximum reach principle--"status" (by recognizing that even geographically disadvantaged countries have rights to maritime resources), the right "to participate in international arrangements as an equal," navigational freedoms, and "security interests in transportation and mobility."^[lxv]  Among the South China Sea claimants, the nonencroachment and maximum reach principles may be especially helpful to Brunei because its limited coastal frontage would otherwise be in danger of being dominated by the longer coasts and larger claims of Malaysia.

            ** Each competing country is allocated some maritime area.  This principle is similar to the nonencroachment and maximum reach principles, but it is worth restating in this form to emphasize how the ICJ has reasoned in recent years.  Although it has attempted to articulate consistent governing principles, its approach to each dispute submitted to it has, in fact, been more akin to the approach of an arbitrator than that of a judge.  Instead of applying principles uniformly without regard to the result they produce, the Court has tried to find a solution that gives each competing country some of what it has sought and thus can accept.^[lxvi]  In that sense, it operates like a court of equity, or as a court that has been asked to give a decision ex aequo et bono.^[lxvii]  Perhaps such an approach is inevitable and even desirable, given that the goal of a maritime boundary delimitation is to reach an "equitable solution."

            ** Islands have a limited role in resolving maritime boundary disputes.  Islands can generate maritime zones,^[lxviii] but they do not generate full zones when they are competing directly against continental land areas.  This conclusion has been reached consistently by the Court and arbitral tribunals in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case, the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, the 1982 Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf case, the 1985 Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, the 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the 1993 Jan Mayen case, and the 1992 St. Pierre and Miquelon arbitration.^[lxix]

            A few examples may be useful to illustrate how the Court has reasoned.  In the Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf case, the ICJ followed the Anglo-French arbitration and gave only "half-effect" to Tunisia's Kerkennah Islands in delimiting the continental shelf between the two countries, even though the main island of Kerkennah is 69 square miles in area and has a population of 15,000.^[lxx]  In the Gulf of Maine case, the Court's chamber gave only partial effect to Canada's Seal Island even though a permanent year-round population resides on the island.^[lxxi]  Perhaps most dramatic is the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, where the court ruled that the tiny uninhabited island of Filfa, belonging to Malta, should be disregarded altogether, and that the main island of Malta should, in effect, be given only partial effect because of its small size in relation to Libya's broad coast.^[lxxii]  Malta's main island is 122 square miles in land area, and has a population of 350,000, yet it was not considered to have full power to generate extended maritime zones when opposed by larger land areas.  The more recent decisions in the St. Pierre-Miquelon arbitration and the Jan Mayen case reaffirm this approach.  The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were given only territorial sea enclaves plus a corridor to the high sea,^[lxxiii] and Jan Mayen was given a reduced zone because of its limited size in relation to the broad coast of Greenland.^[lxxiv]

            The results in these cases are of profound importance to any dispute involving islands.  Without exception, the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have ruled that islands do not generate full zones in relation to opposing larger land areas.  Even if an islet is entitled to generate an exclusive economic zone, its capacity to generate such a zone is always viewed as very weak in relation to any competing claims from opposite or adjacent continental or large-island land masses.

            ** The vital security interests of each nation must be protected.  This principle was also recognized in the Jan Mayen case, where the ICJ refused to allow the maritime boundary to be drawn too close to Jan Mayen island, and it can be found in the background of all recent ICJ decisions.  Even as early as the 1917 decision of the Central American Court of Justice on the Gulf of Fonseca, it was emphasized that the waters of the Gulf had to be viewed as jointly owned by the three adjoining states because of the "primordial interests" of "the economic, commercial, agricultural and industrial life of the riparian States" as well as the "the interest of national defense."^[lxxv]  The refusal of tribunals to adopt an "all-or-nothing" solution in any of these cases illustrates their sensitivity to the need to protect the vital security interests of each nation.

 

CONCLUSION

            The legal principles governing islands are still in some dispute, but consensus can be identified on some issues.  With regard to sovereignty, actual and effective control, particularly during the past century, is the most important factor, and it will usually be decisive if some level of acquiescence or acceptance by other nations can also be established.  With regard to generating continental shelves and exclusive economic zones, countries are making broad claims for uninhabitable islets, but the better approach is to require a permanent, nonmilitary population of at least 50 or so before an islet is allowed to generate an extended maritime zone.  And with regard to boundary delimitations, it is clear that islets play a limited role, particularly if they are uninhabited or sparsely inhabited.  In some cases, they play a small or reduced role in determining the angle or placement of the delimitation line, and in other cases they play almost no role at all.